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On the 23rd anniversary of the September 11 attacks… What has changed in the ideology of terrorist groups?
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By: Elham El Naggar
Research Assistant in the Terrorism and Extremism Program
Aya Ashraf
Research Assistant in the Terrorism and Extremism Program
Introduction:
The events of September 11, 2001, represent a significant turning point in history, as these attacks altered the global landscape politically and security-wise, being the largest act of terrorism on American soil, resulting in over three thousand fatalities in simultaneous attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York by two hijacked airplanes. Another attack targeted the Pentagon building in Virginia, while a third hijacked plane crashed in Pennsylvania. These attacks served as a catalyst for the emergence of other groups, and their presence has led to changes in both their ideological and operational levels.
Consequently, this report aims to highlight the most prominent terrorist groups currently active and the strategies they follow, questioning whether their ideology has changed or if their approach remains the same. The report also addresses the challenges and strategic crises faced by the United States in combating terrorism more than two decades after this pivotal event.
First: The Most Prominent Terrorist Groups
Despite the presence of many factions and organizations in most parts of the world, the “Al-Qaeda and ISIS” organizations remain the most prominent on the international stage. Below is a map of the most influential and threatening groups that we can outline as follows:
The most notable jihadist organizations that emerged from Al-Qaeda:
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 encouraged the birth of more Salafi jihadist movements and organizations, the most important of which is the so-called Islamic State. This hybrid organization emerged from an Iraqi jihadist group known as the Islamic State in Iraq, which later moved to Syria in the early stages of the Syrian crisis. In 2004, the Jordanian “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” established Al-Qaeda in Iraq and led a bloody armed uprising against the Iraqi government and U.S. forces, carrying out suicide bombings that killed thousands of civilians. However, after “Zarqawi” was killed in a U.S. airstrike near Baqubah north of Baghdad in 2006, he was succeeded by “Abu Ayoub al-Masri,” who declared the establishment of the “Islamic State in Iraq.” In 2010, “Abu Ayoub al-Masri” blew himself up with an explosive belt after being ambushed by U.S. and Iraqi forces. The leadership then passed to the Iraqi “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” who announced in 2013 the merger of the “Islamic State in Iraq” and the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, “Jabhat al-Nusra,” to form the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIS). Several provinces emerged from ISIS, including the “Sinai Province” in Egypt, “Khorasan Province” in Afghanistan, and others.[1]
Active Organizations and Groups in the Horn of Africa:[2]
The Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia, which is considered one of the political Islam movements, is a militant group that emerged in Somalia and ideologically follows Al-Qaeda. It is referred to as the military wing that split from the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia due to its alliance with the Somali opposition, and it has managed to control approximately 80% of central and southern Somalia. Additionally, there are Eritrean Islamic parties, and the Eritrean Islamic movement has also appeared, which nearly grew naturally away from those conflicts. However, with the release of Islamic leaders from detention who joined the Eritrean Islamic movement and led its public face (the Muslim Pioneers Organization), the “Islamic Party,” which changed its name to “Justice and Development,” is considered representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is one of the rebel armies in Uganda, having waged a war characterized by violent attacks and kidnappings. The Ugandan government has responded with a comprehensive military crackdown in the areas it controls in northern Uganda.
Active Organizations and Groups in the Sahel Region (Central and West Africa):
Numerous armed groups operate in the Sahel region, each with diverse backgrounds and points of origin. Some have ideological dimensions, such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa. Other groups can be classified based on their goals and geopolitical affiliations, such as separatist movements in Mali and Niger, and self-defense groups in Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Following a wave of coups in 2020 in the Sahel and the withdrawal of French and United Nations forces from Mali and Niger, armed groups have intensified their activities, exploiting the vacuum left by the departure of Western forces that were working to establish peace in the region. Additionally, terrorist groups are active in the northern and central areas, which are the most tense and resource-rich. Among the most significant of these terrorist organizations are the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Ansar Dine group, along with three other groups that united under the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, led by the Malian Iyad Ag Ghaly. Other notable groups include ISIS in the Sahara, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and the al-Murabitun organization led by Abu Bar al-Sahrawi, succeeding Abu Walid al-Sahrawi. These groups are spread across most Sahel countries, particularly in central and northern Mali, where they control vast areas rich in gold and drug smuggling routes.[3]
Active Organizations and Groups in Central Asia:
The “Islamic Movement” and extremist fundamentalist groups have been active in Tajikistan, a former Soviet republic, since its independence in 1991, which is before the establishment of the “Al-Qaeda” and “ISIS” organizations and their emergence into existence. The initial activities of their cells began in the Asfara region bordering Uzbekistan, and then they spread vigorously to other regions and provinces of Tajikistan.
Second: The Strategy of Work and Thought of Al-Qaeda and ISIS
1- At the ideological level:
The ideology of “ISIS” as well as “Al-Qaeda” is based on the principles of global jihadist thought, with its roots and branches, which includes the “establishment of Islamic rule” that can only be achieved through jihad. From this definitive principle, all the concepts, details, and procedures established by the global Salafi movement have emerged. Thus, the ideological roots of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are shared; both belong, in their religious roots, to the “jihadist” currents that encompass a wide spectrum of groups and figures that Al-Qaeda symbolizes and represents its ideas. The Islamic State “ISIS” is, on one hand, a split from Al-Qaeda, but on the other hand, it is undoubtedly a natural evolution of it.
2- At the organizational level:
Al-Qaeda set conditions for fighters to join its ranks, subjecting them to tests of religious background and loyalty based on systematic ideological extremism, along with rigorous military training. In contrast, ISIS accepts anyone who pledges allegiance to its leader, whether they have recently quit drugs, have a criminal record, or have quickly sympathized with the organization to be immediately tasked with carrying out a specific operation. Al-Qaeda worked on a plan based on the idea that each group affiliated with it would be responsible for a specific area, meaning it followed a “decentralized” model, indicating that the organization allowed these groups to operate individually while maintaining the idea of “unifying the Muslim community” through the “destruction” of existing societies and the establishment of alternative communities, which it considers to be the “true” community according to its beliefs.[4]
3- On a tactical level:
For two decades, al-Qaeda has not indicated any intention to occupy or isolate territories and expand within them, whereas ISIS, on the contrary, sought to emulate states by establishing political, financial, and judicial institutions and imposing strict laws on the population. Additionally, after the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda continued to present itself as the vanguard of extremist organizations and did not aim to establish a “caliphate” in the short term. Therefore, it adopted several methods aimed at remaining as cohesive as possible by providing capabilities and directing them towards attracting fighters.
The fundamental disagreement between the two organizations was over the main enemy. While al-Qaeda considers Western countries and the United States its primary enemy, ISIS is preoccupied with controlling territory and forming its state, viewing its main enemy as what it calls the “local enemy.” The conflict between ISIS and al-Qaeda extends beyond their disagreement with the Nusra Front to a difference in ideological approach regarding the priorities of jihad and the definition of the enemy. Al-Qaeda has concluded that the priority is to fight the distant enemy, such as the United States and its allied regimes and Israel, while ISIS insists on prioritizing the fight against the nearby enemy.[5]
4- At the recruitment level:
The failure of political systems in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and other countries in the Middle East to build a national state has created fertile ground saturated with rigid extremist ideas. This has attracted thousands of young people to the ranks of ISIS to confront the sectarian war declared by the ruling regime in Damascus and Baghdad under Iranian sponsorship. “Sectarianism” has become a key term in the nature of conflict and an effective tool used by regimes and groups to achieve ideological and political goals. Additionally, the collapse of the middle class, the absence of transparency, the dominance of nepotism, and the loss of equality have led to a lack of economic opportunities and weakened social welfare systems provided by states.[6]
Thus, ISIS exploited the desire of marginalized individuals for revenge against society, especially those who did not have the opportunity for education, could not find jobs, and, on top of that, lost their families. Consequently, young people find these extremist groups that open their arms to them, offering a sense of belonging and connection, making them feel accepted and part of a community. This instills in them a sense of self-confidence, importance, and distinction. As a result, these marginalized and oppressed groups become affiliated with the aggressor and adopt an aggressive stance against the society they perceive as violent, thereby mimicking the aggressor to whom they belong.[7]
5- At the promotional level
The difference between the two organizations in their approach to the internet is vast. Al-Qaeda’s use of the internet was limited, confined to a few forums and windows, whereas ISIS surpassed this by exploiting all information revolutions and modern applications for mobilization and recruitment. It established chat groups and a messaging network for recruitment through the platform formerly known as Twitter and Facebook, which was more enticing and extensively utilized by the organization. Within less than a decade of the birth of ISIS, its media machine emerged as a parallel army to the organization’s military, penetrating the world according to a media strategy that fulfills institutional ambitions, the details of which were drawn from the significant and major leap that ISIS made in terms of global propaganda and its immense capacity for recruitment. This shift transformed the operational theory from an elitist approach to a mass-oriented one, from complex selective methods to rapid recruitment and planning for operations, from specific and restricted targets to a broad list of objectives, and from organized planning to unrestrained individual action. There are multiple factors, not just one, behind the unprecedented efficiency in recruitment on the part of terrorist groups.
Third: The New Strategy of Work for ISIS and Al-Qaeda
The new strategy of ISIS is based on the following:
Adopting a proactive approach, meaning choosing the time and place to carry out more violent, high-impact terrorist operations that claim the largest number of lives.
Transitioning from a tangible caliphate to a virtual state through social media, utilizing it to serve the “organization,” in an attempt to revive and boost morale, and appointing governors and leaders to replace those killed in battles and those who have fled.
Calling for the unification of the jihadist movement and halting ideological splits.
As for Al-Qaeda:
It worked on changing its rhetoric after 2011, attempting to introduce and use new terms that had not been part of its discourse, such as “the nation,” and it abandoned the tone of superiority it had used in its visual and written releases. The discourse aimed to be free from explicitly imposing a “theoretical” vision, and the waves of change pushed Al-Qaeda to direct its focus and efforts towards the governments and peoples of Muslim countries by intensifying terrorist operations against security forces and others. Al-Qaeda relied on not intensifying external operations and worked to avoid security crackdowns, leaving the field open for ISIS and its elements to be vulnerable to security targeting, as Al-Qaeda adopted a strategy based on “intellectual” dissemination rather than geographical control.
Fourth: The International Reality and the Changing Map of American Threats
There is no doubt that the events of September 11 were a pivotal moment in human history, as they shaped American strategy in the world for more than two decades. This led to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, overt intervention in the Middle East, and numerous domestic decisions that restructured the American internal security system to align with this new challenge. Now, after twenty-three years have passed since this defining event, we clearly observe new features of change in American strategy towards the world. This change may have been imposed by the demands of the current reality, marked by the resurgence of competing powers against American hegemony, such as Russia and China, in addition to commitments that have burdened the U.S. towards European countries. Furthermore, there has been a noticeable decline in American influence in the Middle East and the emergence of regional actors with significant roles, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran. Additionally, the nature of conflict in the current international system has renewed, from the war in Ukraine to the war in Gaza and civil wars in Africa, coinciding with the emergence of challenges that are not security-related but have significantly threatened global stability and security, such as climate change, sustainable development challenges, and the spread of the COVID-19 virus.
Fifth: The Challenges Facing the American Strategy in Combating Terrorism Two Decades After the Events of September 11
The United States faces significant challenges in updating its strategy for combating terrorism. Despite the successes it has achieved in preventing major attacks like those on September 11, many experts believe that the current model is unsustainable and call for a reassessment of priorities. They advocate for a shift from complete reliance on military force to building civil capacities and international partnerships, emphasizing the need to balance counter-terrorism efforts with addressing other challenges posed by the international environment. The most important of these challenges include:[8]
The Evolving Nature of the Terrorist Threat:
Terrorist organizations have continuously developed their strategies, particularly in terms of moving away from a centralized structure that facilitates tracking. They have shifted from large organizations to smaller cells that are more difficult to monitor and identify their members, making it challenging to target them. Additionally, these organizations have leveraged modern technological advancements for communication, recruitment, and planning attacks, which accelerates the spread of extremist ideas. Furthermore, ideological extremism is no longer limited to jihadist ideology; rather, extreme right-wing ideologies have emerged that threaten the American homeland and the West in general.
Balancing Multiple Priorities:
In the aftermath of September 11, the United States found itself at the pinnacle of global dominance, with no potential competitors and an environment devoid of strategic competition and challenges that troubled global and American security alike. However, this calm and relative stability did not last long as the rise of competing powers began to divert American attention from its war on terrorism, drawing it into a security struggle for dominance, particularly with Russia and China and their allies. Additionally, unconventional challenges such as climate change and pandemics emerged, requiring the allocation of extra resources. Furthermore, pressing domestic needs such as infrastructure, education, and health also demand sufficient funding.
Changing the Nature of Conflict:
The conflict with terrorism is no longer purely a military struggle; it has transformed into a battle of ideas and values that requires new tools such as diplomacy, social programs, combating online extremism, and countering ideology with ideology. This compels the United States and its partners to shift from traditional strategies in combating terrorism to a more flexible approach.
The difficulty of building effective international partnerships:
The United States faces a central dilemma that hinders its counter-terrorism efforts: the differing agendas and priorities of partner countries in combating terrorism, which makes it difficult to achieve consensus on appropriate strategies and desired objectives. Additionally, the internal politics of these countries significantly affect their foreign relations and agendas.
Challenges related to financing:
Countering terrorism requires massive budgets that cover areas such as intelligence, military operations, and capacity building, in addition to the need for fair and effective distribution of available resources among various entities involved in counter-terrorism efforts. Strict mechanisms must be put in place to evaluate these efforts in a manner that ensures transparency and accountability in the use of funds allocated for counter-terrorism.
The difficulty of defining and measuring success:
It is difficult to reach a specific point where we can determine that it is a point of success for the various strategies in combating terrorism, including the American strategy, due to the multiple objectives of counter-terrorism, which makes it hard to define clear indicators of success for these strategies, in addition to the dynamic nature of the threat; as the terrorist threat continuously evolves, making it difficult to assess success in the long term.
Sixth: The American strategy… From the global war on terror to a more selective approach
After the events of September 11, the United States declared a comprehensive war on terrorism, which included the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the expansion of military operations in other regions. Over time, the costs of this war became exorbitant, both in human and material terms, in addition to the decline in popular and international support for it. Consequently, American policymakers began to reassess this approach and adopt a more selective and focused strategy on specific threats, avoiding long-term wars.[9] This strategy fundamentally relies on several key transformations, the most important of which are:
From total war to limited war:
The United States declared a comprehensive war on terrorism following September 11, which included the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the expansion of military operations in other regions. This strategy was based on the idea of eliminating terrorism in its strongholds. However, with the increasing human and material costs, and the rise in international criticism, the United States shifted towards a more selective strategy, focusing on targeting terrorist leadership and undermining the ability of terrorist organizations to carry out large-scale attacks.
From focusing on states to focusing on individuals and groups:
The United States focused on regime change in countries harboring terrorist organizations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but the decentralized nature of terrorist threats and activities prompted it to focus on individuals and groups using various methods such as special operations and airstrikes.
From military solutions to comprehensive solutions:
The United States primarily relied on military force to confront the terrorist threat, and over time, it realized that the military solution alone was insufficient. There was a need for a comprehensive approach that includes economic development to undermine the roots of extremism and institutional building to support partner countries in combating terrorism and extremism through awareness and education programs.
From focusing on the Middle East to a global focus:
The Middle East was the center of American attention in the fight against terrorism, but with the emergence of new terrorist threats in other regions, such as Africa and South Asia, the United States has expanded its operations to address this threat on a global scale.
Based on the current realities of challenges and changes in the landscape of terrorist organizations since 2001 until now, and the rise of the Islamic State organization “ISIS,” the United States called for the establishment of an international military coalition in 2014 to contain the threat of this organization. The coalition includes dozens of member countries from various continents, and the contributions of these countries vary between direct military participation and providing logistical, intelligence, and financial support.[10] Its aim is to:
Defeating ISIS and reclaiming the territories it controls, especially in Iraq and Syria.
Preventing the resurgence of the organization and undermining its ability to reorganize its ranks.
Confronting the extremist ideology that fuels terrorist organizations like ISIS.
Supporting efforts to stabilize the areas that have been liberated from ISIS control.
The coalition seeks to achieve these objectives through military operations such as conducting air and naval strikes against ISIS targets, providing support to local ground forces, cutting off ISIS’s funding sources like oil and antiquities trade, preventing foreign fighters from joining ISIS and returning to their home countries, and countering the propaganda spread by ISIS through social media.
conclusion:
According to the race show, more than two decades after the events of September 11, the United States of America finds itself in urgent need of a review of its traditional strategy to combat the threat of terrorist organizations against the new variables and challenges that have put this strategy into question, especially after the military force on which the United States has relied for the years of its fight against terrorism has proved no longer viable on its own. and may even be particularly counterproductive with the remarkable development of mechanisms and methods used by terrorist organizations that have made it difficult to combat them, This is further complicated by the emergence of many other challenges associated with the international environment that require more attention and effort, notably strategic competition with China, Russia and Iran, Israel’s support in the Gaza War, as well as cyberthreats, climate change and the spread of pandemics and diseases. In the light of these developments, the following directions could be proposed for the American Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
Focus on combating the root causes of terrorism: Key issues leading to extremism, such as poverty, injustice and marginalization, must be addressed through investment in sustainable development and building more just societies.
Strengthening international cooperation: International cooperation to combat terrorism, exchange intelligence and build broad alliances to counter this common threat must be strengthened.
Building on multifaceted strategies: military, political, economic and cultural strategies to combat terrorism must be combined.
Combating online extremism: Effective strategies must be developed to combat online extremism, and technology companies’ cooperation in this area.
Building resilient societies: resilient societies must be built in the face of extremism, through promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence.