The full-scale Russian attack on Ukraine has disrupted the geopolitics of Europe. Changes in security dynamics, regional balances, and national foreign policy stances have resulted throughout the continent. In this environment, France’s policy towards Russia and Ukraine have undergone a significant shift.
At the same time, French politics looked like they may collapse this summer. The extreme right received a lot of support in France during the European Parliament elections held in early June. Then, left-leaning parties gained ground in the two rounds of French legislative elections. August saw contentious talks to form a new government. But as autumn approaches, there’s a sense in French politics of, if not stability, then continuity. The new government in France appears prepared to maintain its essential mediating power on the most important foreign policy matters.
Lately, Sant’Egidio had its annual “Meeting for Peace,” with thousands of attendees, during two days of contemplation focused on the theme “Imagining Peace.” Two years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron received an invitation to speak at the gathering, which gave rise to the notion of holding the 2024 edition in Paris.
Notably, French President Emmanuel Macron argued that “Peace is only possible in coexistence,” in addition to calling for a new world order and reconsidering the French-Russian relationship. This claim raised a lot of questions on whether Macron is planning to change his hard stance on Russia.
At the same time, EU countries are experiencing shifts in their stance towards Ukraine with a potential Trump 2.0. As a group of leaders gathered around French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy argue, can they eventually give Kyiv whatever it takes in the face of Trump’s opposition? Should they accept Trump’s effort to end the war and take the lead from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán? It would be preferable, as the delegations from Germany and Italy are stating, to collaborate with Washington and assist form the agreement. Most importantly, how can the leaders of the continent prevent their nations from becoming more isolated as a result of the abrupt shift in US foreign policy?
A New World Order
Speaking at the Sant’Egidio International Meeting for Peace in Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron advocated for a “new international order” and mentioned “rethinking” relations with Russia in light of the conflict in Ukraine. Macron has stated that he desires a new system to protect peace both within and across the continent. Also, highlighting how incomplete and unjust is the current system thus aiming to build a new international order. He added that the geographic reality of Europe must be considered, which is not confined to the EU or, most obviously, NATO. In order to maintain peace on this continent, “we must reconsider how Europe is organized and our future connections with Russia,”
The president of France remarked that the world order that exists now was established following World War II and is “incomplete” since it failed to account for future global changes such as the technology revolution and climate change. Macron stated that a new paradigm should embrace wider peacebuilding strategies along with equitable representation for all European nations.[1]
Moreover, He added that politicians should envision “tomorrow’s peace” in Europe in a different way and as a different reality. He also stated that after Moscow-Kiev dilemma ends, relations with Russia should be reevaluated.[2]
France’s new government
Barnier is a traditional French conservative who generally agrees with Macron’s foreign policy tenets. Having served as President Jacques Chirac’s foreign minister before, Barnier hails from a generation of French politicians that value their nation’s strategic independence and the EU’s role as a springboard for French goals.
The continuity of Barnier’s foreign policy staff is emphasized. Sebastien Lecornu, the defense minister for the previous two years, will remain in his position, as agreed upon by Barnier and Macron. The centrist new foreign minister, Jean-Noel Barrot, is another cabinet member who served in earlier Macron administrations. Since Macron’s 2017 presidential campaign, Barrot’s chief of staff, Aurelien Lechevallier, has been a key advisor to Macron.[3]
The team put up by the new prime minister, Michel Barnier, is probably going to continue along the same route that French President Emmanuel Macron has been on for the past few years when it comes to transatlantic relations, Israel’s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, and France’s support for Ukraine against Russian. Since the stability of the current government will be determined by internal matters, none of these foreign policy concerns are expected to result in a vote of no confidence in the near future.
On the other hand, the French extreme right might use a significant escalation of the Ukrainian situation in the medium run to set off a political catastrophe.[4]
France’s stance on the war
Macron faced criticism for denying Russia “the humiliation” in the early months of Russia’s attacks, but he subsequently strengthened hi stance. Since then, Paris has sent several long-range SCALP missiles to Ukraine, and Macron declared in February that a coalition will provide Kyiv with “medium- and long-range missiles and bombs.”[5]
While there has allegedly been support from some nations for another of Macron’s plans, sending military instructors to Ukraine, no progress has been made thus far.
As Russia has become more isolated since the beginning of the full-scale assualt, it has strengthened its connections with China, Iran, and North Korea and it has gradually used up its stockpile of military hardware.
However, a few Western nations, including Slovakia and Hungary, recommended that they prepare themselves for a normalization of relations with Moscow.[6]
Ukraine will be the new foreign policy team’s top priority right now. Despite opposition from the extreme left, France must carry out its obligations to Ukraine by honouring the terms of its ten-year bilateral security cooperation agreement with that country, which was approved by the previous National Assembly.
In the near future, this entails guaranteeing the viability of financial assistance from the EU and bilateral donors, which will top €1.3 billion in 2024 (in part by reaching a consensus on a plan for the confiscation of frozen Russian reserves). Additionally, Paris will need to keep training Ukrainian forces and supplying military hardware.[7]
Lecornu’s continued appointment as the minister of the armed forces contributes to France’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s operational demands. Lecornu was a key player in the passing of the 2024–2030 military programming law, which transferred French assistance to Ukraine, and in the acceleration of industrial production in both the European and national spheres. Macron hardened France’s stance last year in an effort to support Ukraine and thwart Russian aggression. He made the concept of “strategic ambiguity” the focal point of French policy.
After months in which domestic politics consumed Paris, France will also need to reassert its credibility diplomatically. Macron must do this if he wants his nation to participate in a cease-fire or peace deal. The necessity to have a conversation about the operational, military, political, and legal assurances that would be required for Ukraine’s security in the future was examined at France’s 2024 conference for Ukraine.[8]
Reasons for a potential U-Turn with Russia
1- A Blocked International Order
The French leader seeks to restore relations with Russia with surprising claims at the Paris Peace Conference organised by the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio. He stated that the majority of countries on this planet, including the most populous nations, did not exist when the distribution of power was established. Macron underlined the need of acknowledging this fact. Because of this, the world’s current international order is “blocked,” according to the president of France. When President Macron attends the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24–25, he has pledged to take this matter back on the table. “We require a system in which all nations are fairly represented and in which no one nation can prevent another from doing so. The UN, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund—three far more equitable institutions—must be used to do this,” he said.[9]
2- The Emergence of the Far Right
Russia has strongly backed far-right leaders across the globe trying to take advantage of any divides in Europe that would erode support for Ukraine. It’s unknown how the Far right and Russia are related. Marine Le Pen, a former leader of the Republican National Guard and presidential candidate who has visited Moscow multiple times and been positively covered by Russian state media, has expressed her admiration for President Vladimir Putin. The party eventually paid back a €9.4 million loan it took out from a Russian bank last year in order to survive in 2014.[10]
Right-wing politicians in Europe recently demanded an end to Western assistance for Ukraine in its fight against Russia during the European National Conservatism Conference last April. While declaring that his nation would continue its relations with Moscow, the Hungarian leader also criticized Western assistance for Ukraine in its struggle against Russia.[11]
Moreover, Peter Pellegrini’s win in Slovakia’s presidential election is only the far right’s most recent victory in Europe. Robert Fico, the prime minister, gains more power after he easily defeats pro-European challenger Ivan Korčok by a margin of six points, despite the fact that the presidency is essentially symbolic. The outcome is only one of the many successes that European politicians who back Vladimir Putin are seeing.[12]
Across the continent, the far right is gaining public support. In recent national elections, far-right parties have also gained ground in the Netherlands and Portugal. Ahead of this year’s legislative elections in Austria, Belgium, and Germany, polling indicates they should also make gains in these nations. If another party can be persuaded to form a coalition with the far-right, Putin-supporting Freedom party, there is a genuine chance that this party will retake power in Austria’s elections. Across Europe, there’s a feeling that the extreme right is gaining traction and growing beyond its typical core vote. This means not just an increase in vote share for the far right, but for a pro-Putin far right.[13]
Why does this matter? Given a significant obstacle like military assistance for Ukraine, an expanding far-right faction aligned with Putin will undoubtedly make its voice heard. Ukraine is a particularly important problem since it will undoubtedly come up during crucial talks regarding more financial, military, and humanitarian aid as well as how much the EU is willing to support Ukraine by lowering trade barriers on goods imports. Although von der Leyen has stated that if re-elected for a second term, defence and security will be her main priority, this may be more challenging given the growing pro-Putin sentiment in the European parliament and the European Council.[14]
3- US Elections
The U.S. presidential election in November 2024 will have major consequences for Europe. Transatlantic relations would face significant obstacles if President Donald Trump were to win reelection since it would likely signal a return to his America First agenda. Vice President Harris’s victory may signal a turning point in American politics and maybe a move away from the continent in foreign policy.
Europeans are extremely worried about how their security will be affected by another Trump presidency. It is obvious that US backing for NATO and Ukraine is still essential. NATO wouldn’t be able to defend Europe without a definite commitment from the US in terms of both political leadership and conventional and nuclear capability. Europeans anticipate that Trump will use NATO’s Article 5 as leverage to increase military spending even further than they have already done in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, based on Trump’s own words.
Another cause for concern is Trump’s stated interest in negotiating a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine. There is little confidence among European leaders in Trump’s willingness—or ability—to make negotiations with Putin on a cease-fire part of a comprehensive strategywith lasting benefits, let alone a peace plan that would fully protect Ukraine’s sovereignty.[15]
On the other hand, Europeans are less fearful of a presidential Kamala Harris. Harris has declared her unwavering backing for both Ukraine and NATO. This is not to suggest that the European Union would not have difficulties; Harris would also hold the countries of Europe to a high standard. This would probably entail higher defence budgets within NATO as well as more assistance for Ukraine.[16]
Conclusion:
The growth in support and influence for the Putin-supporting far right across Europe, of which Slovakia is the latest country to fall victim, is a grave security risk to the continent. This coalition, which also includes the National Rally of Marine Le Pen in France and the Austrian Freedom Party, does not see Russia as the grave security threat that it is, and they are hesitant to back the crucial coordination of security and military strategy with NATO. This will tragically affect the people of Ukraine by preventing the EU from coordinating crucial aid for that country in the near future.
Moreover, Transatlantic relations would face significant obstacles if President Donald Trump were to win reelection since it would likely signal a return to his America First agenda. Vice President Harris’s victory may signal a turning point in American politics and maybe a move away from the continent in foreign policy. It is obvious that US backing for NATO and Ukraine is still essential. NATO wouldn’t be able to defend Europe without a definite commitment from the US in terms of both political leadership and conventional and nuclear capability.
Thus, the resurgence of the Far Right and the upcoming US elections are considered two main factors that highly affect EU countries stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war which also are pushing them to quickly find alternative ways to maintain order amid chaos and uncertainty.
