Azerbaijan and the African Gateway: An Analysis of the Defense Agreement with Somalia

Prepared by: Amani El-Sorogy

Assistant Researcher – Turkish States Studies Program

The signing of the defense cooperation agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Somalia in February 2025 marks a significant shift in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy orientation, particularly in its security dimension. Baku has not traditionally been known for its engagement in geographically distant regions such as East Africa, nor has military cooperation been among its primary tools of influence beyond the Caucasus region. However, this agreement reflects simultaneous transformations on two levels: first, Azerbaijan’s desire to diversify its alliances and spheres of influence under the framework of a “multi-vector foreign policy”; and second, a redefinition of the post-war state’s role in a shifting international environment.

This strategic shift raises questions as to whether Azerbaijan’s move toward Somalia represents a deliberate, expansionist strategy or merely a tactical effort to establish symbolic international presence in open arenas. It also invites a closer examination of the broader context that has driven Baku to expand its footprint in unconventional regions like the Horn of Africa—particularly amid intensifying regional and international competition over this highly strategic zone.

The Strategic Background of Azerbaijan’s Defense Outreach

Since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, Azerbaijan has adopted a more ambitious approach in its regional and international policies. This shift has been driven by the country’s decisive military victory, which reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus. The war granted President Ilham Aliyev significant political capital, allowing him to strengthen state control and broaden Azerbaijan’s foreign engagement by leveraging hard power as a bargaining tool in regional politics.

In parallel, Baku has increasingly embraced what is known as “security diplomacy,” which combines defense expertise transfers, security agreements, and partnerships in the military-industrial sector. This approach aims to bolster Azerbaijan’s regional influence without becoming directly entangled in armed conflicts. Such a strategy has manifested in military cooperation with Pakistan, enhanced security relations with Central Asian countries, and a growing emphasis on energy security in the Caspian Sea.

The outreach to Africa represents a natural extension of this trajectory. As a rising power, Azerbaijan seeks to diversify its global presence through unconventional tools such as military training, defense capacity building, and security assistance. Yet, this engagement goes beyond the security dimension—it fits into a broader vision to deepen diplomatic, economic, and educational ties with the continent.

In recent years, Baku has intensified its cooperation with several African states across various sectors, most notably energy. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has established a strong footprint in countries such as the Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports to African markets have surged, reflecting efforts to reduce dependence on Europe and Russia as primary outlets for trade and investment.

Azerbaijan has also opened new embassies, provided humanitarian aid, and offered scholarships as part of South–South cooperation initiatives. In 2022, it launched the “Heydar Aliyev Program” for free education targeting students from the Global South, including Africa. Additionally, Azerbaijan has promoted an environmental agenda by offering renewable energy technologies. During COP29, it proposed a program for solar and wind energy development in African countries.

At a time when African states are actively working to build their own military capabilities and reduce reliance on Western arms suppliers, Azerbaijan—boasting a modern military-industrial complex—has emerged as a key partner. Azerbaijani exports of military equipment and weaponry to Africa have increased by 70% over the past three years.

Therefore, the recent defense agreement with Somalia should not be viewed as an isolated initiative. Rather, it represents a step within a broader, integrated foreign policy through which Azerbaijan seeks to redefine its role in the international system and establish strategic partnerships in developing regions that allow for the flexible and gradual expansion of its influence.

 Key Drivers Behind Azerbaijan’s Defense Cooperation with Somalia

Azerbaijan’s engagement with Somalia goes beyond symbolic and diplomatic gestures; it reflects Baku’s aspiration to establish strategic defense relations with a geopolitically vital state located on a critical maritime corridor. The primary drivers behind this cooperation can be outlined as follows:

1- Seeking New Markets for National Defense Industries

Following the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan began gradually investing in the development of its defense industry—either through partnerships with countries like Israel and Turkey, or by building a domestic production base that includes drones, tactical systems, and light weaponry. With the regional market becoming increasingly saturated and competitive, African markets present a vital opportunity for exporting these products—especially to states with growing security needs and less rigid regulatory frameworks than those in Europe. Azerbaijan is likely to use its defense cooperation with Somalia as a pilot platform for future arms deals and training programs with other nations, thereby increasing both the economic and diplomatic returns of its defense sector.

2- Establishing a Foothold in Strategic Maritime Corridors

The Horn of Africa—positioned along key global shipping routes—has gained increasing strategic importance in light of shifting trade patterns and the expansion of energy and transportation infrastructure. Somalia, with its access to the Gulf of Aden—one of the world’s major maritime chokepoints—is a vital entry point for any actor seeking to strengthen its presence in the region.

Given Azerbaijan’s limited capacity for direct military projection beyond its borders, defense cooperation with Somalia offers a smart alternative for establishing a technical and training presence in a vital maritime space. This supports Azerbaijan’s broader goals of safeguarding energy and food supply routes, as well as ensuring the stability of trade corridors that underpin its rentier economy.

3- Exporting the Azerbaijani Security Model for Military Institution-Building

Baku aims to present itself as a successful case of military modernization following decades of conflict, and now seeks to export this model to states in need of institutional military rebuilding—such as Somalia. Its involvement in training and arming Somali forces allows Azerbaijan to play a credible role in restructuring the Somali military and repositions it as a provider of “defensive stability” across the Global South.

4- Protecting Azerbaijani Investments

The defense partnership between Azerbaijan and Somalia also functions as a tool for safeguarding Baku’s emerging investments in Africa—particularly in strategic sectors like energy. In February 2025, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the oil and gas sector, which included technical exchanges and capacity-building programs for Somali professionals.

Amid rising security threats in Somalia—including increased Al-Shabaab attacks on civilian and government infrastructure—it has become imperative for Azerbaijan to contribute to strengthening the country’s defense capabilities as an indirect means of ensuring the sustainability of its investments. Defense engagement thus becomes a dual-use tool—advancing both geopolitical presence and economic protection in a volatile environment.

5- Securing Diplomatic Support in Security-Related Agendas

Defense cooperation with Somalia also serves as a diplomatic lever for Azerbaijan in regional and international forums—particularly concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Despite achieving military victory, Baku continues to seek international recognition of its sovereignty over the region and aims to dismantle outdated negotiation frameworks such as the Minsk Group.

Moreover, Azerbaijan is working to defuse human rights criticisms related to post-conflict governance. By building new alliances in the Global South, Azerbaijan hopes to convert such partnerships into votes of support in international bodies like the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Defense ties with Somalia may help create a politically supportive environment, similar to the backing Azerbaijan has received from Central Asian countries following security cooperation agreements.

6- Expanding Defense Influence in a Politically Low-Cost Environment

Compared to other regions like Europe or Central Asia, defense engagement with African countries—including Somalia—offers Azerbaijan a more flexible environment to test new strategies for expanding its influence. Amid regional and international constraints, cooperation with Somalia allows Baku to broaden its alliance network and enhance its military partnerships without becoming embroiled in direct conflicts or complex geopolitical entanglements.

Furthermore, Somalia’s pressing need for military capacity-building opens new avenues for Azerbaijan to assert itself as an emerging regional defense actor, strengthening its position in a cost-effective and politically manageable setting.

Dimensions of the Military Cooperation Agreement Between the Two Countries

The military cooperation agreement between Azerbaijan and Somalia represents a significant step toward strengthening defense relations between the two countries. Through this agreement, both parties aim to build a strategic partnership that enhances Somalia’s military capabilities across several critical areas. The key dimensions of this agreement are as follows:

1- Defense, Military Security, and Peacekeeping Operations

This clause refers to comprehensive cooperation on national security issues, such as border protection, combating non-traditional threats (e.g., terrorism and piracy), and developing joint defense policies. For Somalia, which faces ongoing internal security threats, this support is crucial for reinforcing stability. The cooperation may also include the potential deployment of Azerbaijani peacekeeping forces.

2- Mutual Visits

Visits between officials and military leaders open direct military-diplomatic channels and are typically used to coordinate defense policies, monitor agreement implementation, and build strategic trust.

3- Exchange of Expertise, Training, and Military Education

This includes sharing knowledge and experience on tactics, operations, military planning, crisis management, and even cybersecurity. Azerbaijan, with its recent experience in unconventional warfare (e.g., the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), may transfer some of these lessons to Somalia.

4- Defense Industry and Technology

This is one of the most strategically significant aspects of the agreement. It implies that Azerbaijan may export military equipment to Somalia or assist in developing its domestic defense industry. Cooperation could include drones or surveillance systems, reflecting the growing sophistication of Azerbaijan’s defense sector.

 Future Prospects for Defense Cooperation Between Azerbaijan and Somalia

Defense cooperation between the two countries represents a strategic step reflecting their mutual aspirations to enhance security and stability in the Horn of Africa. Military and technical cooperation offers Azerbaijan a significant opportunity to expand its influence in this strategic region, which is witnessing growing interest from major powers. By providing military support to Somalia, Azerbaijan can bolster its position as a contributor to regional stability, opening new avenues for cooperation in energy and infrastructure, as well as boosting economic and trade relations between the two sides. However, despite the opportunities it presents, this cooperation also faces complex geopolitical challenges.

For regional powers like Egypt, the Horn of Africa is a key battleground in its long-standing rivalry with Ethiopia, primarily over disputes related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In response, Cairo has sought to deepen its relations with Somalia and other countries in the region, aiming to diplomatically isolate Addis Ababa and counter Ethiopia’s growing influence. Against this backdrop, Egypt may view Baku’s growing presence in the region with caution—especially as Turkey, Azerbaijan’s main ally, strengthens its ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia.

Additionally, the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Somalia faces other difficulties that may affect its long-term sustainability and success, particularly the unstable security situation in Somalia. Despite efforts to achieve stability, persistent threats from groups such as Al-Shabaab continue to undermine these efforts. This tense environment may complicate Azerbaijan’s ability to implement military and technical support programs, potentially hindering the execution of joint defense projects between the two nations.

Another key challenge relates to Azerbaijan’s economic strength. While the Azerbaijani economy remains relatively stable due to its substantial oil and gas resources, its heavy reliance on these commodities exposes it to fluctuations in global oil prices. A sharp drop in oil prices or a domestic economic crisis could negatively impact Azerbaijan’s ability to finance military initiatives and maintain defense cooperation with Somalia. Therefore, its capacity to sustain this cooperation could be limited if an economic downturn affects oil and gas revenues.

Furthermore, building trust and transparency presents a long-term challenge. Despite the existence of formal agreements between the two countries, Azerbaijan may need to demonstrate that its cooperation is not aimed at imposing political or economic dominance in the region. This is crucial for ensuring the sustainability and long-term development of the defense partnership.

In this context, it can be said that in order for Azerbaijan to achieve its strategic goals in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, it must invest consistently in infrastructure and development sectors, as well as humanitarian initiatives that reinforce its image as a constructive partner in the region. If Azerbaijan succeeds in effectively addressing these geopolitical and economic challenges, it will continue to strengthen its influence in the Horn of Africa and realize its broader geopolitical ambitions on the continent.

Conclusion

The defense cooperation between Azerbaijan and Somalia represents a significant strategic move within Baku’s recent “multi-vector” foreign policy. This agreement enhances Azerbaijan’s presence in the Horn of Africa and opens new horizons for military and technical cooperation, while contributing to broader strategies focused on security stability and the protection of economic interests.

Despite the many opportunities this partnership presents, it also faces complex geopolitical and security challenges that may affect its sustainability. Nevertheless, the success of this cooperation largely depends on the ability of both countries to adapt to changing regional and international dynamics and to overcome the associated security and economic difficulties.

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