Articles
Broad Influence: Manifestations of Hezbollah’s Growing Activities in Latin America
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By: Riham Mohamad
Researcher at the Middle East Affairs Unit
In a remarkable development that reflects a shift in the American position towards increasing Hezbollah’s influence outside the Middle East, Washington announced on May 20 a reward worth “ten million dollars” for anyone who provides information that helps disrupt the party’s financial structure in Latin America, in a move that is considered evidence. Due to increasing American fears that the Latin continent may turn into a “safe haven” for the party’s operations, as its security, financial, and logistical interests overlap within a soft security environment and rich in opportunities open to cross-border regulation[1].
In this context, Hezbollah was able, thanks to several years of continuous work, to rebuild itself within Latin America through various methods, including smuggling, money laundering, equipping communities, and concluding alliances with local mafias and some regimes of a popular, anti-Western nature, as this spread was not random. Rather, it was founded on an in-depth understanding of the institutional chaos prevailing in a number of countries on the continent and a systematic investment in the sovereign loopholes that made it a favorable environment for the growth of groups of an ideological and cross-border nature.
First: The historical background of the emergence of Hezbollah in Latin America:
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Lebanese immigration and the establishment of the social base: The beginnings of the Lebanese presence in Latin America go back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when thousands, especially from the Shiite community, moved to countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Paraguay as a result of the economic and political conditions during the period of Ottoman rule, and these communities integrated In local communities, but they retained their cultural and religious ties to their motherland, and over time, These communities have become an important economic and social weight, especially in the trade and industry sectors, which has provided a suitable environment for any organization seeking to benefit from expatriate networks with a wide geographical and financial scope. The importance of Latin America to Hezbollah was embodied in four main aspects: Among them is the presence of large Lebanese communities that can be benefited from socially and economically, in addition to the instability of some security and political systems, increasing rates of corruption, as well as the rugged terrain that facilitates smuggling operations, in addition to the close relationship between Iran and anti-Washington regimes such as Venezuela[2].
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The emergence and expansion of Hezbollah after the civil war: After its founding in 1982 with direct support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah began building a popular base within the Lebanese expatriate communities, taking advantage of its claims to represent the “Islamic resistance” and defend the issues of the Islamic world, especially the Palestinian issue. During the 1990s, the party increased from its activity in Latin America, taking advantage of the return of expatriates, religious and cultural visits, and Shiite charitable and religious networks that were used as a cover for financial activities and recruitment[3].
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“Border Triangle”: A vital strategic point: The “Border Triangle” region, which is located between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, is considered one of the most sensitive places on the continent, as this region is characterized by weak security and increased organized crime and smuggling activity, which made it an ideal environment for the work of cross-border groups. Intelligence reports indicate that the party used this point as a starting point to create a financial network based on smuggling goods and recycling money through fake companies and unmonitored exchange offices[4].
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The shift from cultural presence to operational influence: At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the transition began from a mere religious and cultural presence towards operational activities of a security and economic nature, and Hezbollah’s expansion in Latin America formed part of Iran’s strategies to internationalize the conflict with Israel and the United States through arms. Irregular, which made Latin America a rear fulcrum for the conflict, and this expansion was linked to Iran’s development of its regional strategy under the name “Axis of Resistance.” This prompted Hezbollah to invest in communities as logistical tools within a global network that serves Tehran’s interests. This expansion was not just an emergency activity, but rather became a systematic operation of an intelligence, military, and economic nature, which began with remarkable terrorist acts in Argentina, and later turned into a complex network of illegal activities. This created Hezbollah’s sphere of influence beyond the Middle East[5].
Alleged activities of Hezbollah networks in Latin America:
Hezbollah’s activity in Latin America represents a model for integrating ideological work with organized criminal activity, in a way that serves the party’s strategic and financial goals, these activities are distributed on several levels:
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Financing through the parallel economy and money laundering: As a politico-military organization, external funding constitutes one of the key pillars sustaining Hezbollah’s continued existence-particularly in light of the sanctions imposed on Iran, American and regional reports indicate that the party runs a complex network of shell companies, shops, and informal banks (hawala), which is used to launder money coming from illegal activities such as smuggling cigarettes and electronic goods, and reselling jewelry and precious metals In addition to the used car trade, previous reports estimated that these networks generate billions of dollars for the party, which are either transferred directly to Lebanon, or reinvested in projects affiliated with the party in Africa and the Middle East[6].
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Terrorist operations – the first tool for imposing presence: Hezbollah’s first terrorist operations on the continent were part of the internationalization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was embodied in the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, in response to Israel’s assassination of the Shiite leader “Abbas al-Musawi,” and then came the bombing of the association Argentine Judaism (AMIA) in 1994, resulting in 85 deaths and 150 injuries, and was considered the largest terrorist attack in the history of Argentina These two attacks consolidated Hezbollah’s image as a security actor on the continental scale, and Argentine justice decided that the attack was planned and proved Iran’s involvement in planning and financing, and Hezbollah’s involvement in implementation through its external cells.
While the following years recorded Hezbollah’s involvement in operations that were less resonant but indicated a network expansion, including an attempted bombing in Lima (Peru) in 2014, in addition to a foiled plot in Chile, as well as the seizure of explosives in Bolivia in 2017, leading to a plan to assassinate Israelis and Americans in Colombia in 2021, as part of revenge for the killing of “Qassem Soleimani”[7].
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Organized crime: Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America extended into organized crime patterns, taking advantage of weak borders and the complicity of local officials, as we mentioned previously, the “tri-border” region between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay has become a major center for an illicit trade that includes drug and weapons smuggling, money laundering via Fake companies or bank transfers, and forgery of identity documents.
By focusing on drug smuggling, specifically cocaine, which has become one of the party’s most important activities on the continent since the early first decade of the twenty-first century, as Hezbollah entered directly into the cocaine trade, and the most prominent manifestations of this transformation were embodied through its entry into functional relationships with drug cartels, especially in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, based on the rule of “mutual benefit,” as the cartels use the party’s expertise in smuggling, technology, and counterfeiting, in exchange for the party benefiting from the proceeds of smuggling and safe corridors for its shipments or the movement of its members, the most prominent example of this was the file of the “Jamal Trust Bank Network,” which revealed the party’s role in financing drug smuggling operations from Colombia to Europe, through Africa, through money laundering networks in Lebanon.
In addition, the financier was The Lebanese “Shukri Harb” was one of the pioneers in linking the party with the Colombian cartels, and his network linked groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Jordanian gangs and Syrian smuggling networks. Then the map of cocaine smuggling changed later due to the dismantling of the major cartels, and the market turned into small splinter groups, such as the “Gulf Clan,” and splinter organizations from the Revolutionary Armed Forces, as well as the National Liberation Army. However, the party adapted to these changes and opened two main routes for itself. The first is through Venezuela, supported by the close relationship between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Venezuelan counterpart, Chavez, and the second is through the tri-border region, depending on the Lebanese communities[8].
Challenges of combating Hezbollah activities in Latin America:
Although nearly four decades have passed since Hezbollah’s involvement in the Latin scene, its presence in this geographical and political arena is still growing, based on a complex structure of relationships, breakthroughs, and privileges that make the task of combating it extremely difficult for the Americas. It is worth noting that The Venezuelan government is considered the closest government to Tehran, and the leadership of the two countries enjoys strong economic, political, and personal relations, especially after “Hugo Chavez” took power and after “himNicolas Maduro”, if various sources indicate that Venezuela formed a political and security fulcrum for the party in that era, and played a pivotal role in providing a safe environment and political cover with a diplomatic direction for Hezbollah’s activities, due to the close political relations between Tehran and Caracas, from this standpoint, the most prominent can be detailed the challenges that complicate the task of confronting the party within the continent:
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First: Exploiting Arab communities and infiltrating official institutions: The presence of large Arab communities in Latin America -whose number, according to the latest estimates, exceeded twenty million people- provided fertile ground for the party to recruit elements loyal to it, and some of these, as ordinary citizens working within the various military and civil government sectors, formed an important link within state institutions, which allowed him to penetrate a number of official departments, provide sensitive information, and facilitate his logistical and administrative movements as a result, the security services lost the element of surprise and secrecy, which weakened the effectiveness of security operations and pre-emptive strikes against the party.
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Second: Benefiting from documentary privileges through Venezuela: Through its close relationship with the Venezuelan government, the party was able to provide its members coming from the Middle East with official documents, most notably Venezuelan passports, which gave them the ability to move freely within the continent, disguised with new national identities that make it difficult for the authorities to distinguish between them and immigrants or local citizens, which has hampered monitoring, tracking, and prosecution efforts.
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Third: The spread of institutional corruption: Administrative and financial corruption is one of the most entrenched phenomena in the political and administrative structure of a large number of Latin American countries, and has become the goal of groups that practice illegal acts, because of its ability to buy loyalties, bribe officials to pass on its actions, or turn a blind eye to them, and then the party exploited this factor to gain access to decision-making centers and neutralize some supervisory bodies, by buying receivables and passing on its activities in exchange for bribes Several reports appear, including those indicating that former Argentine President Carlos Menem received money from Iranian intelligence to influence the course of investigations into the Buenos Aires bombings, which prove Hezbollah’s involvement in them, whether these allegations are true or not, they indicate the extent of the susceptibility of a number of elites. Politics are influenced by political money coming from Tehran or its agents[9].
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Fourth: Limited resources and weak security structure: The majority of Latin American countries suffer from chronic economic weakness, which is directly reflected in the performance of their security and intelligence institutions, which lack the necessary equipment, technologies, and cadres to combat cross-border organizations, and in some cases, local gangs and militias possess the strength and armament, it exceeds the state’s capabilities, which makes the state unable to pursue an organized entity such as Hezbollah Who finds in this fragile security reality an ideal environment for his movements.
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Fifth: The complexities of geography and the breadth of borders: The Latin continent is characterized by vast areas and long and complex borders, which are difficult to control, especially in light of modest financial capabilities, for example, Brazil’s borders extend for more than 16 thousand kilometers, while the common border between Argentina and Chile exceeds 5 thousand kilometers, this large area and long borders are difficult to control and easy to penetrate, and with weak security budgets, these open spaces have become ideal loopholes for smuggling Providing safe havens for the party’s movements and sleeper cells, away from the eyes of the authorities, and thus it became one of the most important factors that led to the difficulty of fighting the party by the countries of the region.
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Sixth: Building a network of alliances with gangs and armed militias: In the absence or weakness of the state, parallel forces emerge from strong informal organizations that fill the security vacuum, as is the case in a number of Latin American countries, and the party has woven intertwined relationships with a number of these entities, to gain their support and benefit from their networks, they began to provide them with protection in exchange for cooperation, and these groups have become, in some areas, the de facto authority This hinders any actual government efforts to undermine the party’s activities[10].
In conclusion:
Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America reveal a complex model of unconventional expansion of a military-political organization that acts as an external arm of Iran, taking advantage of the gaps in sovereignty, corruption, and institutional weakness in the countries of the continent, until it has become a safe playground for its financial operations and intelligence activities, and with local political complicity and apathy. Institutionalization and the extension of its networks within local communities, confronting this challenge requires a comprehensive approach that is not limited to traditional security methods Rather, it is based on the drying up of resources and ending with the restructuring of relations with supporting parties. Therefore, the recent American moves may be the beginning of an international escalation, but they alone will not be sufficient unless the Latin American countries themselves take steps to protect their national security from this cross-border penetration.