India is a rising power, but its transformation is occurring in the shadow of China’s even more impressive ascent. A closer alignment with Washington likely represents India’s best chance to counter China and secure its interests in this unbalanced environment.
Over the past three decades, the US-India relationship has grown stronger because to a variety of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, as well as greater cooperation in strategically significant areas including technology and defense. President Joe Biden described the relationship as “stronger, closer, and more dynamic than any time in history” during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US last September.
For the United States, foreign policy has consistently been a blend of safeguarding interests and advocating values, and India meets several of these criteria. Washington and New Delhi frequently emphasize that the United States, the oldest democracy in the world, is collaborating with India, the largest democracy. Collaborating with India presents significant opportunities for U.S. security objectives, especially in terms of Washington’s approach to countering China. This was one of the foundations of the rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington in the post-Cold War period, as reflected in the joint declaration that was concluded during President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000.
Essentially, There is possibly as much bipartisan agreement in Washington on strengthening ties with India and considering it a long-term strategic ally as there is on considering China a long-term strategic adversary.
Three main tenets of the US-Indian relationship
India’s position as the greatest democracy in the world, its role as a check on China’s rise, and its potential as a global growth engine are the three main tenets that have shaped US involvement with India in the post-Cold War era.
Pillar 1: India as the world’s largest democracy
The United States’ involvement with India has a strong value-based component. There is a belief that ties with India are based on common ideals, in contrast to the West’s more transactional and interest-based relationships with other nations like Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. An established narrative of similarities between “the world’s oldest democracy” and “the world’s largest democracy” lies at the heart of this. Claims that India and the US are “natural allies” are also based on their shared democratic background.[1]
Pillar 2: India as a counterpower to China
Beijing’s ties with Washington and New Delhi have also deteriorated in line with the strengthening US-Indian relationship. India is no longer as concerned about upsetting China as it formerly was about taking part in Western multilateral and US-led bilateral initiatives. Both nations have expressed concerns about China’s actions, and there has been an increase in defense cooperation between the US and India as well as a more cooperative approach to regional security and global governance.
India, for example, is now more inclined to criticize China’s activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. As a result of New Delhi’s geopolitical limitations, such as its military dependence on Russia and economic dependence on China, India will get closer to the US but still fall far short of an alliance. This raises some questions about India’s possible involvement in a US-China dispute over Taiwan, for instance.[2]
Pillar 3: India as an engine of global growth
India is viewed as a likely beneficiary of efforts to shift or mitigate supply chains away from China, especially in sectors involving critical and emerging technologies. With the increasing focus on friendshoring supply chains by collaborating with ‘like-minded countries’ and ‘trusted regions,’ the US perceives India’s democratic system as a more favorable alternative to China’s one-party governance.
This perspective is supported by India’s economic capabilities. It has become the fastest growing major economy globally, has overtaken China to become the most populous nation, and is projected to be the third largest economy in the world by the end of this decade. Additionally, India boasts a robust digital ecosystem and a workforce well-versed in IT.[3]
The rationale behind the U.S.-India partnership
Washington’s investment in ties with New Delhi has been motivated by a larger strategic consideration.
More specifically, the ongoing competition in the Indo-Pacific has shaped how the United States views India. In light of China’s growing assertiveness, Washington views India as a democratic counterweight to China, an economic alternative, a more reliable technology partner, and a contributor to regional deterrence, albeit to varying degrees and at different times.
In general, New Delhi agrees with Washington’s assessment of the region, but most importantly, it feels that an assertive China poses the biggest threat to it. Furthermore, India has been eager to collaborate with the US to address this and other regional issues, often even more so than some US allies, particularly in the areas of technology, economic security, and defense.
Thus,In addition to its role in the BRICS, India now plays a significant role in the US strategy to counter China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific,. The US, India, Japan, and Australia are the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). It was brought back to life by the first Trump administration as part of a larger plan to counter China’s assertiveness. In keeping with this strategy, the Biden administration aims to fortify the Quad as a cornerstone of its Indo-Pacific approach.[4]
India’s place in the Quad has been disputed, though. India has taken part in cooperative military drills and diplomatic endeavors, but it is still hesitant to fully commit to the Quad and is not ready to present the alliance as a counterweight to China. India’s resistance to adopting a more assertive posture towards China diminishes the efficacy of the Quad. For the United States to rely on India as a strategic partner in the event of a Pacific conflict, the Quad would have to expand its agenda and foster stronger partnerships.
Trump and India :
Trump was unproven and unknown in the field of foreign policy back in 2017. His critique of China’s predatory trade and economic policies, as well as Pakistan’s undermining of US efforts in Afghanistan in 2017 and 2018, gave the India-US relationship some much-needed support. The Trump White House carried out a number of the actions resulting from earlier decisions, in spite of hostility toward the previous administration.
Ivanka Trump, the former first daughter, traveled to India in November 2017 as part of the Obama-initiated Global Entrepreneurship Summit. In 2016, the Obama administration designated India as a Major Defense Partner. In line with its NATO allies, Trump placed India under Strategic Trade Authorization Level 1, which allows for the release of technology.
With official-level meetings in 2017 and foreign-minister-level meetings beginning in 2019, he brought the once-failing Quad (the United States, Australia, Japan, and India) back to life. Additionally, he traveled to India in February 2020 and participated in a rally of 50,000 Indian Americans with visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Houston in September 2019.[5]
India hopes that Donald Trump’s competitiveness with China during his first term and his emphasis on the Indo-Pacific will return after his reelection. New Delhi probably hopes that Trump would not give much attention to the state of Indian democracy and human rights and would instead expedite the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war.
However, the volatility and transactionalism of a second Trump administration will worry New Delhi. There will be a lot of uncertainty surrounding Trump’s strategy toward China, specifically his potential pursuit of a deal with Xi Jinping and his dedication to cooperating with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
Trump’s “America First” policies tend to advocate withdrawing from global affairs; leading up to the election in 2016, for example, Trump included India among the countries he accused of stealing U.S. jobs. And while his administration formulated an Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, Trump himself seemed less keen and instead sought to forge a working relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping through a bilateral trade deal. The bottom line is that the impact of a future Trump administration on the U.S.-India partnership is simply unknown.[6]
Regarding the economy, India would be concerned about possible tariffs, a U.S. strategy that emphasizes nearshoring or reshoring over friendshoring, and a greater cost or reluctance on the part of the United States for development financing or technology sharing.
In conclusion, India would suffer under a Trump administration if restrictions were placed on international student visas or high-skilled visas, or if India faced increased pressure due to the increased number of undocumented migrants leaving the country.[7]
Concerns over India
Fears in Washington regarding India’s illiberalism are expected to intensify in the upcoming years. The immensely popular Modi is virtually guaranteed to be re-elected this spring, and it is quite possible that by the time he eventually leaves office, a potentially more radical Hindu nationalist successor—like Home Minister Amit Shah or Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath—will have taken shape. Shah, often labeled as India’s “shadow prime minister,” has consistently defended Modi’s actions as chief minister of Gujarat during the 2002 mass violence against Muslims, which Modi faced accusations of allowing.
Concerningly, there are numerous recent instances of Modi’s suppression of human rights and civil liberties, with no indication that India’s increasing authoritarianism will diminish in the near future. When questioned explicitly about India’s democratic decline during Modi’s visit to the White House in June, U.S. President Joe Biden chose not to criticize Modi’s actions, and Modi similarly sidestepped the issue.
The specific manner in which India aspires to be a member of the great powers’ table further strains relations. Naturally, such a move will not go over well because it runs counter to the United States’ objective of continuing to hold its dominant position in the international system. Although India participates in U.S.-led formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (along with Australia and Japan) and supports some of Washington’s interests, New Delhi’s desire for multipolarity sometimes manifests itself as anti-Western.[8]
For instance, India has consistently attempted to participate in multilateral forums specifically intended to oppose the West. These forums include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (composed of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and several Central Asian states) and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and five recently added countries), which is led by China and Russia. Russia, a major geostrategic foe of the United States and its allies, and India continue to have a strong strategic alliance; Russian President Vladimir Putin has praised India for this, referring to India as a “true friend.”[9]
Moreover, India’s participation in BRICS offers a chance for cooperation with China, its main geopolitical adversary. Even though there is still a lot of tension between China and India, particularly regarding territorial disputes, BRICS gives India a way to communicate with China diplomatically. India has the potential to become one of the few nations with close ties to all four major superpowers if it can effectively handle its relations with both China and the US. Furthermore, China’s prosperity is inextricably linked to the Indo-Pacific, which has emerged as the global geoeconomic hub. China therefore has a strong incentive to keep India’s non-alignment policy in place. This would put India in a strategically advantageous position by granting it the unprecedented capacity to mediate in a future conflict in the Pacific.[10]
India has profited economically from Russian oil sales, which enable it to meet its rapidly expanding energy needs. New Delhi is now Russia’s top export destination after buying more cheap barrels of Russian oil in defiance of sanctions led by the United States since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Since India has been buying Russian weapons for many years, the bulk of its military equipment is made in the Soviet Union or Russia.
In regards to New Delhi’s acquisition of Moscow’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, Washington has so far refrained from enforcing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which penalizes nations that buy weapons from sanctioned Russian defense suppliers. This implies that the Biden administration believes that India is too crucial to the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy to be jeopardized by punitive measures.[11]
Conclusion:
Over the last 25 years, the U.S.-India relationship has changed considerably. While not an alliance, today it is a deep partnership, including in the defense and security domains. Structural factors have driven the two countries to cooperate across the administrations of presidents as different as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. The relationship is not without divergences, which currently include India’s partnership with Russia and U.S. policies in parts of South Asia. But if they are managed, if the strategic convergence between Washington and Delhi persists, and if India once again adapts its approach according to a new administration’s priorities and preferences, then this cooperation will continue and possibly even increase.
On the other hand, Although there is broad hope for the future of the U.S.-India partnership, the relationship is actually more delicate than it seems. In fact, the two nations still face tensions in multiple areas that, if not resolved, could potentially jeopardize or completely disrupt future collaboration.
In conclusion, Amid the intense global contestation playing out between the United States, Russia, and China, India’s national interest clearly lies in sustaining the relationship with Russia, deepening the partnership with the United States, and strengthening itself to deal with the enduring and growing challenge from China. At the same time, the United States views India as a democratic counterweight to China, an economic alternative, a more reliable technology partner, and a contributor to regional deterrence, albeit to varying degrees and at different times. Thus, India now plays a significant role in the US strategy to counter China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific.
