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مركز شاف لتحليل الأزمات والدراسات المستقبلية > Reports > Middle East Unit > Situation Assessment > Implications of the Geopolitical Rivalry Between Türkiye and Israel on Regional Security
Implications of the Geopolitical Rivalry Between Türkiye and Israel on Regional Security
- July 29, 2025
- Posted by: Maram Akram
- Category: Middle East Unit Reports Situation Assessment
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Prepared by: Amani El-Sorogy
Researcher in the Turkish States Studies Program
The Middle East is currently witnessing a phase of regional repositioning, where the strategies of regional powers intersect in a way that reshapes Spheres of influence and alliances. The Turkish–Israeli rivalry is considered one of the most complex patterns of this process, due to its entanglement in files of security, energy, and geopolitical influence. Despite being mostly indirect in many of its arenas, it extends across multiple fronts and intersects with international interests, making it an influential factor in the region’s stability and its future trajectory.
Therefore, this report aims to analyze the dynamics of the Turkey–Israel rivalry, shed light on its most prominent potential implications on regional security, and attempt to anticipate the most likely future scenarios of this ongoing competition.
First: Arenas of Rivalry and Strategic Divergences Between Turkey and Israel
1- The Palestinian Issue: It represents one of the tensest files between the two countries and embodies a deep contradiction in political and ideological visions. Following the launch of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and the subsequent large-scale military escalation against the Gaza Strip, the disagreement turned into a strategic clash. Ankara adopted a pro-Palestinian stance, labeling Hamas as a “resistance movement,” and accused Israel of committing “war crimes” — a position that Tel Aviv considered a direct hostility and political incitement. In an unprecedented move, Turkey cut diplomatic relations, suspended trade exchanges, and filed a lawsuit against Israel before the International Court of Justice, further escalating tensions between the two states.
2- The Syrian Arena: Syria is one of the most prominent arenas of competition between Turkey and Israel at present, due to its vital strategic depth for both parties. Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv intensified over shaping the features of the new regional order. Turkey’s strategy is based on preserving Syria’s unity and stability and preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity, while Israel seeks to reshape Damascus as a federal state, turning the south into a demilitarized zone and preventing any Turkish military presence.
Israel implemented his vision by launching hundreds of airstrikes targeting Syrian military and naval installations, alongside expanding its control in the Quneitra and Daraa provinces. On the other hand, Cite the reports Turkey’s efforts to expand its military presence in central Syria, particularly in Palmyra, through establishing bases and deploying “HISAR” air defense systems — increasing the strategic divergence. Tel Aviv responded with five consecutive airstrikes targeting Palmyra Airport and the T4 base, considering this a clear message of deterrence.
The events of Sweida on July 13 marked a new peak in this rivalry. Israel exploited the sectarian unrest to strengthen its military presence under the pretext of protecting the Druze, through airstrikes extending from Sweida and Daraa to Damascus. These directly targeted the headquarters of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including the destruction of the General Staff building, causing significant losses among military leadership. In contrast, Ankara considered this escalation as undermining its efforts to rebuild the Syrian state. Its official position was clearly expressed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who stated: “We have run out of patience — that’s all we will say to Israel, which does not want peace.”
3- The Iranian Nuclear File: Iran constitutes a strategic axis of divergence between Turkey and Israel concerning regional security. This is particularly evident in their opposing positions on the Iranian nuclear program. While Ankara believes that regional stability is achieved through dialogue and economic interconnection and opposes any military action against Tehran, Israel views the file as an existential threat that requires strict deterrence.
This divergence intensified after Israel’s attack on Iran on June 13, 2025, which included bombing nuclear facilities, missile bases, and the assassination of military leaders. Ankara described it as “a dangerous act with malicious intent,” considering it a reflection of “an Israeli mindset that disrespects the law and seeks to drag the world into disaster.” Erdogan called for halting what he termed “Israeli gangster policies,” a position that reflects the widening gap between the two countries regarding the tools of managing regional threats.
4- Geographic Expansion and Conflicting Spheres of Influence: The rivalry between the two countries extends to overlapping regional spheres of influence, most notably the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia, and Africa. In the Gulf, Turkey seeks to enhance its partnerships with Saudi Arabia and Qatar on several fronts, especially in defense nd energy, while Israel is expanding its alliance with the UAE under the framework of the Abraham Accords. This Israeli–Emirati rapprochement coincided with emerging Saudi–Emirati disagreements, providing Israel with an opportunity to intensify its partnership with the UAE as a tool to reshape balance of power n the Gulf — a move viewed by Turkey as an attempt to encircle its regional influence through counter-alliances.
In Central Asia, Turkey leverages cultural ties with the Turkic States o expand its presence, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States, whereas Israel relies on its strong relationship with Azerbaijan as a strategic entry point to the region, especially in light of the wide military and intelligence cooperation between the two, which became evident during the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict.
In Africa, the two countries compete using different tools; Turkey has adopted a comprehensive strategy based on both soft and hard power instruments, while Israel utilizes technology, cybersecurity, and arms sales — particularly in countries witnessing Turkish–Russian competition over arms exports.
Second: Key Potential Implications of the Rivalry on Regional Security
The Turkish–Israeli rivalry goes beyond being a bilateral dispute to become a structural factor influencing the stability of the entire region, due to its complexity and entanglement with sensitive issues. Its key potential implications can be summarized in the following points:
1- Escalation in Shared Spheres of Influence: Given the multiplicity and overlap of rivalry arenas, the chances of indirect friction increase, especially in fragile contexts—particularly Syria—where both Ankara and Tel Aviv are working simultaneously to consolidate their positions without coordination. This creates conditions ripe for indirect escalation or security incidents due to the absence of communication channels. These risks may further escalate if Israeli military operations continue, especially if they target areas where the Turkish army or Turkish-backed factions are present, potentially dragging the region into a large-scale escalation that is difficult to contain.
2- Creating an Opportunity for ISIS to Resurgence: The rivalry between the two countries fosters conditions conducive to the resurgence of ISIS, both regionally and internationally, as the group is likely to exploit political and military chaos to expand its activity in areas such as the Badia, rural Sweida, and eastern Syria. A marked uptick in ISIS activity observed in May underscores the group’s intent to re-establish its presence amid the ongoing regional transition and security vacuum.
3- Complicating the Formation of Stable Regional Security Arrangements: This rivalry hinders the establishment of regional security cooperation frameworks and pushes toward forming narrow blocs and temporary alliances, increasing the fragility of collective security and weakening the chances of consensus on contentious issues such as energy, maritime security, or post-conflict arrangements in Syria.
4- Turning Spheres of Influence into Arenas of Competing Alliances: The escalating rivalry may produce a pattern of geopolitical polarization, where some countries align themselves within opposing alliances led by one of the two parties—one led by Turkey within the framework of the Turkic world or Islamic blocs, and the other supported by Israel in partnership with Western and regional powers such as Greece and the UAE. This deepens divisions and obstructs any future initiatives for de-escalation or collective cooperation.
5- Militarization of Regional Interactions and the Erosion of Political Solutions: The rivalry reinforces a tendency toward militarization in addressing regional issues. Rather than supporting negotiated political solutions, the parties lean toward investing in military proxies and unilateral actions—whether through supporting armed factions, launching airstrikes, or establishing military bases in strategic areas—thereby prolonging conflicts and reducing the chances of building sustainable peace.
6- Threatening Stability in Sectarian and Ethnic Flashpoints: The rivalry contributes to destabilizing sectarian and ethnic balances in sensitive areas such as northern Syria, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the Caucasus. Ankara seeks to expand its influence through socially and developmentally connected networks, while Tel Aviv builds security relationships with groups such as the Kurds and Druze. This overlap may exacerbate latent tensions and hinder the construction of stable local governance structures, dragging communities into a cycle f sharp regional polarization. This could potentially ignite latent conflicts and increase the fragility of local governance.
7- Repositioning of Global Powers to Compensate for Strategic Losses: The rivalry creates relative vacuums in some traditional spheres of influence, prompting global powers like Russia to reactivate their military and economic presence to compensate for their waning influence, particularly in regions such as the Caucasus and Syria. Meanwhile, China exploits the rivalry to expand its investments in infrastructure and energy, while Iran sees it as an opportunity to strengthen its indirect influence through militias, under the banner of resisting both Turkish and Israeli influence.
8- Surge in Smuggling and Transnational Organized Crime: In light of the competition over influence in border areas, security monitoring systems erode, and the opportunities for non-state actors to exploit Vacuums ncrease, leading to a rise in smuggling activities—whether of weapons, people, or strategic goods such as oil and medicine. The weak coordination between the competing powers reinforces organized crime networks and redraws the map of the informal economy in the grey zones between Turkish and Israeli control.
Some border crossings may even be turned into tools of geopolitical pressure, with competing parties using them to tighten control over communities supportive of the opposing side. This deepens humanitarian crises and poses additional challenges to stabilization and development efforts in border regions.
9- Entering an Arms Race: Tensions between Turkey and Israel are fueling a dangerous regional arms race. Erdogan officially announced plans to boost the production of medium- and long-range missiles in response to regional developments, particularly the Israeli–Iranian conflict. Turkey is also investing heavily in developing the “Steel Dome” (Çelik Kubbe) system as a competitor to Israel’s “Iron Dome.” Meanwhile, Israel seeks to strengthen its alliances, diversify its partners, and enhance the efficiency of its air forces and military technologies.
Third: Most Likely Future Scenarios
Scenario One: Resumption of Dialogue Amid Disagreements (Likely)
Despite the intensifying rivalry between the two countries, it is expected that both parties will move toward limited understandings—whether publicly declared or managed through backchannels—that allow them to avoid direct confrontation, without necessarily overcoming core disagreements. This trend is not based on normalization intentions as much as it reflects a “pragmatic management of disagreements,” whereby the relationship continues within a framework of pragmatic coordination when necessary.
This scenario is reinforced by the negotiations between the two countries, mediated by Azerbaijan since last April, which has hosted three rounds of talks so far. These aim to establish a mechanism to avoid clashes and build a coordination framework between the two in Damascus similar to the one established with Russia. Moreover, Tel Aviv seeks to avoid opening additional conflict fronts and is aware that Ankara would respond directly to any attack targeting its military assets. As a NATO member, such a scenario could also potentially involve the alliance under Article Five.
On the other hand, Ankara does not seek confrontation or direct conflict with Tel Aviv in Syria, recognizing that such a clash at this moment does not serve its strategic interests—especially given the multiple files it is managing and its aim to solidify its regional role as an influential power without getting dragged into conflicts that could undermine that role. This was evident in the statement by Hakan Fidan, who said that Turkey wants to achieve stability in Syria and avoid provocations or entering into any conflict with other states in the region. The United States also plays a role in supporting this scenario; President Trump explicitly expressed a desire to prevent any escalation between Israel and Turkey.
Scenario Two: Quiet Escalation and Continued Indirect Rivalry (Possible)
This scenario assumes the failure to establish a coordination mechanism between the two countries, resulting in continued tension without sliding into direct confrontation. This would stem from Israel’s insistence on its demands in Syria. Realism of this scenario lies in Israel’s internal political dynamics; Benjamin Netanyahu tends to exploit external crises to maintain his political position. Thus, Sustaining ension with Turkey serves his strategy.
Israel also views Turkey as a more significant threat than Iran and seeks to curb Turkish influence—particularly in Syria—by supporting the Druze and Kurds to destabilize Damascus. Continued Israeli military operations also make reaching understandings difficult. This creates a model of “cold conflict”: no real dialogue, no open escalation, but an ongoing power race in every geopolitical arena, fueled by mutual distrust and conflicting interests, while leaving room for potential coordination if necessary.
Scenario Three: Sliding Toward Open Strategic Confrontation (Unlikely)