Articles
Israeli Military Bases in the Horn of Africa: Strategy of Influence and Redrawing Power Balances in the Red Sea
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By: Dina Lamloum
Coordinator of African Affairs Unit
Introduction
Israel’s interest in the African continent extends beyond geopolitical objectives and interests to include military aims, primarily to expand its sphere of influence and dominance in the Red Sea region and to deter any current or future aggression. Israel thus seeks to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa, despite already possessing a military base in Eritrea. The choice may also fall on Somaliland, which is actively seeking international recognition, with Ethiopia potentially serving as a partner in this phase—especially following Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland to access the Red Sea. This context explains the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister to Ethiopia in May, under the pretext of strengthening bilateral relations, security cooperation, and counterterrorism. However, Israel’s moves may be independent of Addis Ababa, and such activities will impact the security and stability of the region, given the long history of violations and disregard for international and humanitarian law by both Ethiopia and Israel.
Israeli’s Base in Eritrea
Israeli-Eritrean cooperation dates back to the mid-1990s, evolving into a strategic alliance aimed at making Asmara a pivotal ally in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Israel established a military base on the Dahlak Archipelago, located 43 km from the Eritrean coast and 135 km from the capital. This is Israel’s second-largest naval base outside its borders and one of the most advanced intelligence centers in the Horn of Africa and the Bab al-Mandab region, overlooking the Red Sea—one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.
Israel utilizes surveillance towers atop the islands’ mountains to gather intelligence on military activities in the Red Sea and neighboring countries, relaying this information to the Israeli Air Force for targeting military zones around the archipelago. The base also serves to monitor Iranian movements in the region and secure Israeli maritime trade. Israel has launched military operations toward Sudan from this base, under the pretext of Sudanese support for Hamas. Additionally, Israeli naval units off the Dahlak base were used to launch attacks on Lebanon during the July 2006 war and to fire rockets at Hezbollah positions.[1]
Dahlak Base[2]
Expanded Israeli Military Movements in the Horn of Africa
Despite possessing a base in Eritrea, Israel continues to seek military footholds in other Horn of Africa countries for several strategic reasons:
1- Enhancing Deployment and Diversifying Options
Relying on a single base or country exposes Israel to risks in case of political or security changes, as occurred when Israeli forces at the Dahlak base were attacked in late 2023. Therefore, Israel aims to diversify its military and intelligence dependencies to mitigate risks and expand its operational reach.
2- Expanding Regional Influence
Presence in multiple Horn of Africa countries allows Israel greater capacity to monitor maritime routes, Iranian and Turkish movements, arms smuggling, and activities of groups like Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis), thereby expanding its influence in a strategically vital region.
3- Securing Israeli Interests in the Red Sea
The Red Sea is a crucial maritime passage for Israel. Multiple bases and centers enable Israel to better protect its interests and ensure they are not threatened by any regional actor.
4- Countering Threats and International Competition
Multiple military bases empower Israel to counter regional and international rivals, such as Iran and Turkey, and to exert greater influence over the security dynamics of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.[3]
Israeli Plans for Access to the Red Sea
Israel may employ several tools to strengthen its presence in the Red Sea, either by supporting Ethiopia in acquiring a base in Somaliland and leveraging Addis Ababa’s advantages or by directly recognizing Somaliland and establishing a base there. This would allow Israel to encircle the Houthis and influence the Red Sea’s security equation:
1- Strengthening Israeli-Ethiopian Rapprochement
Security and Intelligence Cooperation:
Israel and Ethiopia maintain close security relations. In November 2020, the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service signed an agreement with Israel’s Mossad to enhance intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation in the Horn of Africa, including information exchange and capacity building. In 2021, security agencies in both countries arrested 16 suspects in Addis Ababa planning attacks on the UAE embassies in Ethiopia and Sudan. Military cooperation has expanded in recent years, including cyber and intelligence domains, with Israel providing military support, training, and equipment to Ethiopia.[4]
On May 5, the Israeli Foreign Minister, accompanied by a high-level trade delegation, visited Addis Ababa. The delegation included representatives from Israeli companies in strategic sectors such as agriculture, water and climate technologies, renewable energy, innovation, and medical devices. This visit reflects strategic dimensions amid regional tensions and intersecting Israeli-Ethiopian interests, especially concerning the Red Sea.
Given repeated Houthi attacks on Israel, the visit may have aimed at logistical arrangements, intelligence support, and joint coordination in the Red Sea to secure Israel’s vital maritime routes through defense cooperation with key regional states, notably Ethiopia, which continues to seek Red Sea access.[5]
Israeli-Ethiopian Security Coordination on Red Sea Navigation:
Amid regional developments, including the recent Israel-Iran war, Israel is particularly interested in Ethiopia’s quest for a Red Sea base—a goal shared by Israel to secure itself from Houthi attacks and enhance its presence in this geostrategic area. Thus, Israeli-Ethiopian security coordination on Red Sea navigation is likely, with Israel supporting Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, either directly or indirectly, through implicit alliances with Somaliland.
This arrangement would benefit both: Ethiopia would realize its long-held maritime dream, and Israel would cement its presence in the region. However, this poses significant risks to regional security, especially for Egypt, which would face two adversaries at the southern gate of the Suez Canal, threatening its security and providing leverage in various files—not only for Cairo but regionally—given both countries’ history of circumventing international norms.
2- Opening Up to Somaliland
Israeli Base in Somaliland in Exchange for Recognition:
Since its 1990 declaration of independence from Somalia, Somaliland has sought international recognition, viewing strategic partnerships as a path to this goal. In January 2024, Somaliland signed an agreement with Ethiopia, and by the end of the year, reports indicated that Israel was negotiating with Somaliland to establish a military base in exchange for recognition. Diplomatic sources confirm ongoing talks, and given Somaliland’s eagerness for recognition, acceptance of an Israeli base is plausible, potentially with a third-party mediator.[6]
Israeli Recognition of Somaliland:
Should Israel recognize Somaliland, the latter could become a player in international and regional circles. Recently, Hargeisa’s government has pursued recognition at any cost, as evidenced by the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, which would allow Ethiopia to establish a Red Sea base via Somaliland in exchange for formal recognition. While the agreement has not materialized, arrangements may be underway in secret, possibly with Israel as a mediator, especially given the Red Sea’s strategic importance and recent tensions.
Thus, Israeli recognition of Somaliland may occur in exchange for Red Sea access, either directly or by encouraging other states, such as Ethiopia, to do so, with Israel providing the necessary support and cover for Addis Ababa to act despite international opposition. Israel may also provide financial and logistical support for the base, which Ethiopia cannot afford alone amid economic decline and internal crises. Alternatively, Israel may not immediately recognize Somaliland, but with ongoing regional changes and Hargeisa’s insistence, such recognition is increasingly likely.
Reasons for Choosing Somaliland: