In the aftermath of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu” declared on September 29th that this operation is part of a systematic Israeli plan aimed at altering the strategic reality in the Middle East.[1] This announcement was made amid escalating Israeli military operations on several fronts, particularly in Lebanon and Yemen. “Merkava” tanks are positioned on the southern Lebanese border awaiting attack orders, while Israel targeted Yemen’s Hodeida port with airstrikes—its second significant military breakthrough in a short period,[2] These actions coincide with Israel’s ongoing efforts to combat Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as part of a broader Israeli strategy to neutralize these organizations and strike a blow against Iran’s regional interests. These military maneuvers point to a larger ambition of reshaping regional dynamics and the emergence of a “New Middle East” from Israel’s viewpoint. In light of these developments, questions arise regarding Israel’s vision for this shift and its strategic implications, especially after Iran retaliated for the assassinations of Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh by launching hundreds of missiles on “Tel Aviv” and “Ashkelon” on the night of October 1th [3] and How Israel intends to reshape the regional landscape in line with this vision remains a critical question.
Firstly: Regional Dynamics in the Middle East Before the October 7th Attack
The Middle East witnessed profound regional transformations prior to the October 7 attack, resulting from a combination of internal and external pressures. These factors pushed countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to adopt a policy of “zeroing problems and prioritizing interests”[4] to mitigate the conflicts that had exhausted the region for over a decade. For example, Egypt moved towards improving its relations with Turkey through complex diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia experienced a shift in its foreign policy following the Biden administration’s [5] rise to power, adopting a strategy to diversify its alliances, moving away from total dependence on the United States. It sought to strengthen its ties with regional powers like Iran through security and political discussions, and also worked on building stronger partnerships with China and Russia. This development raised concerns in Israel, which viewed these alliances as a direct threat to its interests and national security in the region.
Similarly, both the UAE and Qatar followed a comparable approach to enhance their regional roles. Qatar played the role of mediator in several regional conflicts, which bolstered its position as a key player in easing regional tensions. On the other hand, the UAE was a pioneer in normalizing relations with Israel through the “Abraham Accords,”[6] while at the same time, it worked to strengthen its relations with Iran and Turkey to maintain balance in its regional policies. Hence, the regional dynamics before the October 7 attack can be summarized as follows:
1- The return of Syria to the Arab League: The return of Syria to the Arab League represented a significant development in regional dynamics. This shift reflected a growing recognition among Arab states that addressing the Syrian crisis requires direct engagement with the Syrian government in Damascus. The aim of this policy shift was to seek regional stability by containing the ongoing repercussions of the Syrian conflict within the framework of a “zero problems” policy. This included addressing the continued drug trafficking networks, particularly of Captagon, which was manufactured in Syria and used to fund criminal and terrorist activities. At the forefront of these concerns was the growing influence of Iran through militias supported by Tehran.[7]، Saudi Arabia, in particular, led this regional policy shift toward Syria, driven by several reasons that revolve around Riyadh’s ambition to enhance its position as a leading regional power and its role in reshaping the Arab political landscape. This strategy aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader efforts to diversify its economy away from complete reliance on oil, while also expanding its international and regional alliances in line with “Saudi Vision 2030.”[8].
2- Saudi-Iranian Normalization: Saudi-Iranian relations witnessed a notable shift following the signing of the normalization agreement on March 10, 2023, under Chinese mediation, significantly impacting regional dynamics in the Gulf.[9]، This shift reflected both parties’ willingness to overcome their historical differences and enhance regional stability. In this context, Saudi Arabia reopened its embassy in Iran in early August 2023. The resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations contributed to a degree of regional stability by paving the way for closer Gulf-Iranian relations, including a reduction in Iranian interventions in the internal affairs of Gulf states. This rapprochement also led to relative breakthroughs in certain Arab crises. In the Yemeni crisis, the largest prisoner exchange between the Yemeni government and the Houthis took place in April 2023. In the Iraqi crisis, following the normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tehran, Iran announced that Iraq, with U.S. approval, had released $500 million of frozen funds to settle part of Iraq’s debts to Iran. [10] These developments highlight the positive impact of the improved Saudi-Iranian relations on the balance of power in the region. With the restoration of relations, clear messages were sent about the need for cooperation between Gulf states, reflecting shifts in the regional discourse that could challenge Israeli dominance amidst these new dynamics
3- Saudi-Houthis Peace Talks: The peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have seen notable progress within the context of regional dynamics. These talks were a direct result of the improved relations between Riyadh and Tehran, as Saudi Arabia sought to secure its strategic interests by attempting to end the conflict in Yemen. [11] This was part of a broader effort to reduce regional tensions. Direct negotiations were held in Sanaa, with the presence of Saudi and Omani delegations. The primary goal of these negotiations was to reach an agreement that would establish a permanent ceasefire and lift the blockade on Yemeni ports and airports, a crucial step toward restoring stability in the region.
4- Egyptian-Turkish Rapprochement: Egyptian-Turkish relations experienced significant transformations within the framework of regional dynamics prior to the October 7 attack. The two countries began improving their relations after years of discord, adopting a policy of “dialogue and openness.” [12] This dynamic reflected the desire of both nations to achieve stability and strengthen bilateral relations, contributing to regional security. Consequently, this rapprochement posed a challenge to Israel, as both countries sought to enhance their regional alliances at a time when Tel Aviv faced increasing threats from Iran and its proxies. The Egyptian-Turkish cooperation reflected the potential to form a regional axis capable of countering Israeli influence, thereby hindering Tel Aviv’s ability to manage and direct its policies in the region.
5- Qatari Thaw: Qatar has sought to improve its relations with other Gulf states following the reconciliation achieved at the “Al-Ula” Gulf Summit in 2021, [13] This reconciliation has contributed to strengthening ties among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This step opened new channels for dialogue and cooperation and reflected Qatar’s efforts to rebuild trust among Gulf states. Through this dynamic, Qatar aimed to play a more active role within the Gulf framework, driven by a collective awareness of the importance of unity in addressing regional challenges.
In this context and from an Israeli perspective, these shifts have constituted a strategic threat to its interests in the region. The new alliances among Gulf countries, Egypt, and Turkey, along with the rapprochement of these nations with Iran, have prompted Tel Aviv to reassess its regional policy. Israel, which has historically relied on fragmenting the Arab world and fostering divisions, now views these alliances as a direct threat to its security and interests. Consequently, Israel has adopted a more aggressive stance toward these coalitions, perceiving these movements as attempts to diminish its regional influence and strengthen a robust Arab front that could establish a new balance of power, thereby hindering its quest for dominance.
Secondly: Description of the Political and Military Situation in the Middle East After the October 7th Attack
The political and military situation in the Middle East following the October 7, 2023, attack has undergone profound transformations at various levels, particularly concerning Iran and its proxies in the region, as outlined below:
1- Regarding Hamas: In the aftermath of the October 7th attack, the movement suffered significant military losses due to intensive Israeli strikes. Although this attack initially demonstrated Hamas’s strength at the onset of the conflict, the Israeli retaliatory response, through airstrikes and ground incursions into the Gaza Strip, inflicted substantial damage on Hamas and its military infrastructure. However, despite these strikes, Israel was unable to completely eradicate Hamas; the movement shifted its military resistance to underground tunnels, complicating Israel’s efforts to achieve a decisive victory. This situation also led Israel to adopt a policy of targeted assassinations, executing operations against prominent Hamas leaders, including “Ismail Haniyeh”. On the political front, Hamas faced immense pressure due to the destruction of its infrastructure in Gaza, where most government institutions, including universities and hospitals, as well as vital facilities, were devastated. This situation resulted in significant paralysis of civilian governance in the enclave. Despite these pressures, Hamas remains capable of maintaining its role as a key player in the Palestinian arena, continuing its operations under the leadership of “Yahya Sinwar”.[14] The political and military leadership of Hamas is still being managed from secret locations. Overall, although Hamas’s military and political power has diminished following the October 7 attack, the movement has not been completely defeated and continues to play its role, albeit while facing significant challenges on both military and humanitarian fronts.
2- Hezbollah: Following a series of devastating strikes targeting Hezbollah over the past four months, which resulted in the deaths of several senior leaders, including its chief Hassan Nasrallah, and injured thousands of mid-level commanders in the attacks known as the “Pager Operations,” Hezbollah is now facing an unprecedented internal crisis and confusion. This situation has created an opportunity for Israel, which seeks to exploit the chaos not only to push Hezbollah forces back to areas beyond the Litani River— a strategic objective Israel has pursued for years— but also to contemplate the complete dismantling of Hezbollah. While achieving this goal in the short term faces significant obstacles, including an unprecedented Iranian response earlier this October that impacted Israeli territory, Israel is relying on a long-term strategy that includes precise military tactics and psychological warfare aimed at undermining Hezbollah’s morale. The ultimate goal is to gradually dismantle the organization and fulfill its strategic objectives in the region.[15]
3- Islamic Resistance in Iraq: The role of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has emerged as one of the regional military actors, escalating its operations against Israeli and American targets in the region. This entity comprises several armed factions supported by Iran, and the period following the Israeli attack on Gaza has seen a significant increase in its military activity. The resistance has executed attacks against American bases in Iraq and Syria, expanding its operations to target sites within the occupied Palestinian territories. Notably, it conducted an attack on the Ramat David Airbase in June 2024,[16] reflecting its role as part of the resistance axis aimed at confronting Israel through military and political means.
4- Houthis and the Prosperity Guardian: Following the October 7 attack, the Houthis have significantly emerged on the regional scene, launching attacks on Israel for the first time, which indicates their expanding influence beyond Yemen. These attacks targeted Israeli military bases and vessels, as well as those of Western countries in the Red Sea, demonstrating the continued strength of the Houthis despite the military campaign led by the “Prosperity Guardian,”[17] spearheaded by the United States since January 2024. Despite the substantial expenditure of $30 billion, the coalition has failed to achieve significant results, while the group has effectively continued to utilize its arsenal of missiles and drones. In light of this, the Pentagon has acknowledged the need for a more stringent strategy. However, achieving a complete defeat of the Houthis seems unrealistic given their nature as an ideological group operating in a challenging asymmetric environment. Consequently, the stringent strategy may focus on reducing their attacks rather than eliminating them entirely.
In light of Israel’s declared objectives since the onset of the war in Gaza, the primary goals are clear. First and foremost, Israel aims to eliminate Hamas, which it perceives as an existential threat to its security in the region. In this context, Israeli military operations have focused on destroying Hamas’s missile capabilities and military infrastructure, including tunnels and facilities used for launching rockets and storing weapons. Additionally, Israeli forces have targeted Hamas field commanders to undermine the movement’s military capacity. Alongside the elimination of Hamas, Israel seeks to recover Israeli prisoners held by the group, viewing this issue as a national matter that affects public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and soldiers. However, Israel has not succeeded in achieving a decisive victory in these two objectives. Consequently, it has expanded its operations to include the Lebanese front, attempting to weaken Hezbollah’s military strength by destroying its missile arsenal and strategic sites in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Israel is striving to create a security buffer in southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah activity and ensure the safe return of displaced residents in northern towns.[18] It can be argued that all these objectives revolve around a common theme: achieving relative Israeli progress before the upcoming U.S. elections, improving the image of the Israeli government domestically and internationally, and presenting itself as a state capable of asserting itself as a regional power that can defend its interests.
Thirdly: Strategy Towards the New Middle East
The map of the Middle East clearly indicates that regional war is closer than ever. Israeli actions in the region are not only a defense of its security but also an attempt to restore its prestige and image after being undermined in the eyes of global public opinion. Therefore, the Israeli government’s strategy towards the “New Middle East” is linked to several political, economic, and military factors aimed at reshaping the geographical and political reality in the region in favor of Israel. For years, Israeli leaders, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have asserted that there are strategic changes in the region that require unconventional measures to enhance Israeli national security and revive the plan to establish a Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates[19] as the followings below:
1- Reshaping the Geographical and Political Borders of the Region: Israel is clearly seeking to reshape the geographical and political landscape of the Middle East in line with its expansionist goals. The fundamental idea behind the “New Middle East” strategy is to expand Israeli borders and assert control over more territory, not only within the framework of “Greater Israel” but also to ensure its military and economic superiority in the region. Consequently, Israel focuses on annexing parts of the West Bank, particularly major settlements, and aims to maintain control over Jerusalem and its surrounding areas to ensure complete dominance over the key points of the Palestinian conflict. Through this strategy, Israel seeks to leverage regional conditions to its advantage, including internal conflicts in Arab countries such as Syria and Yemen, as well as international tensions among major powers. This explains the proposal presented by Israeli General “Giora Eiland” in November 2023 [20] regarding the expansion of Gaza at the expense of Egyptian territory in Sinai, which falls within the framework of efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue at the expense of neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt.
2- Undermining the Iranian Threat: Iran is the largest regional adversary of Israel and represents a primary concern in shaping Israeli national security strategy. Iranian support for its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen heightens Israel’s anxiety and drives it to undermine this influence through close cooperation with the United States. The conflict with Iran is not limited to the military arena; it also extends to the diplomatic and economic spheres. Israel works to internationally isolate Iran and impose further economic sanctions against it. From an intelligence perspective, Israel has aimed to humiliate and degrade Iran in the region by executing several assassination operations on Iranian soil that have struck at its security depth. Additionally, the Israeli-Gulf rapprochement is seen as part of the strategy to contain Iranian influence, as Sunni Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE share Israel’s concerns regarding Iranian threats.
3- Maintaining the United States as an Ally in the Region: The United States has long been Israel’s strongest and most influential ally, with military and political support being a cornerstone of Israeli strategy. Since “Donald Trump” took office, American-Israeli relations have significantly progressed, particularly with the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the introduction of the “Deal of the Century,” which included principles designed to bolster Israeli control over large parts of Palestinian territories. However, with the internal political changes in the United States, especially following the Biden administration’s arrival, Israel is striving to maintain this support, albeit at a reduced pace compared to before. Nonetheless, Israel recognizes that the United States may move toward reducing its military engagement in the region, especially after the presidential elections, which compels Israel to accelerate its military operations and achieve as much as possible of its grand strategic plan to strengthen its influence in the region and enhance its position at the negotiating table.
4- Normalization of Relations with Saudi Arabia: The future of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is currently at a critical and complex juncture. The events of October 7 have effectively closed the door on any serious normalization attempts for the time being. Saudi Arabia, which had previously expressed a willingness to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for progress on the Palestinian issue and the acquisition of a civilian nuclear program, is now imposing strict conditions for normalization. It demands a halt to Israeli aggression in Gaza and tangible progress toward the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital before any normalization can occur. On the other hand, Israel faces significant challenges due to the hard-line right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, which rejects the concept of a two-state solution. Statements from government ministers, such as Itamar Ben Gvir, emphasize Israel’s unwillingness to make any substantial concessions. However, this situation may be temporary, and a future change in the Israeli government could open the door to new normalization opportunities. The United States may also exert additional pressure on Israel to offer concessions if it wishes to strengthen its strategic relations with Riyadh. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s position will remain firm and contingent upon Palestinian rights.
Fourthly: Concluding Remarks
1- Continued Expansion of Military Operations: Israel is expected to continue expanding its military operations against armed groups associated with Iran, particularly the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This aligns with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision of reshaping the geopolitical reality in the Middle East, viewing the escalation of military actions against Iran’s proxies as a means to undermine their influence in the region.
2- Transferring Tensions to New Fronts: Tensions are likely to be transferred to new arenas, such as the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, increasing the probability of military confrontations in these areas. The escalation may extend beyond Iran’s proxies to include targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. Conversely, Israel may face retaliatory escalations from Iran through its proxies, with Tehran potentially intensifying indirect attacks against Israeli targets via the Houthis and Hezbollah. These groups may also aim their operations at Israeli interests or expand their attacks to include international shipping routes in the Red Sea, which could drag the region into a comprehensive regional war.
3- Reconstructing the Palestinian Issue: In light of Netanyahu’s vision for a “New Middle East,” it is clear that the increasing Israeli military operations are part of a broader strategy aimed at reducing Iranian influence and securing Israel’s vital interests in the region. This involves reconstructing the Palestinian issue through the gradual annexation of territories, while simultaneously weakening and fragmenting the resistance axis.
Resources:
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[3] انتهى الرد.. إيران أطلقت وابل صواريخ على إسرئيل، العربية، تاريخ النشر: ١ أكتوبر ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/xREJZ
[4] أمل عبدالله، محددات نجاح سياسة “تصفير المشكلات” في الإقليم، مركز المستقبل للأبحاث والدراسات المتقدمة، تاريخ النشر: ٢٨ مايو ٢٠٢٣، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/roPfq
[6] اتفاقات أبراهام وموجة التطبيع العربي مع إسرائيل، الجزيرة نت، تاريخ النشر: ٩ يونيه ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/FlFZo
[7] عودة سوريا للجامعة العربية: تحولات السياسة الإقليمية وتأثيرها على الأزمة السورية، منظمة الحركة السياسية النسوية السورية، تاريخ النشر: ٣١ مايو ٢٠٢٣، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/ZSTXK
[8] كيف تُمكن قراءة عودة سوريا إلى الجامعة العربية بعد عزلها لسنوات؟،France 24،، تاريخ النشر: ١٩ مايو ٢٠٢٣، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/EdoNU
[9] سامية بيبرس، إيران: ” ماذا بعد تطبيع العلاقات مع السعودية… الفرص والتحديات”، مجلة الشؤون العربية، العدد: ١٩٥، تاريخ النشر: ١١ سبتمبر ٢٠٢٣، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/hFVpg
[13] معتز سلامة، قمة العُلا ٢٠٢١: هل انتهت الأزمة الخليجية مع قطر، مركز الأهرام للدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية، تاريخ النشر: ٩ يناير ٢٠٢١، متاح على الرابط: https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/17030.aspx
[14] أمل عبدالعزيز، «حماس» وتداعيات هجوم السابع من أكتوبر، الشرق الأوسط، تاريخ النشر: ٥ مارس ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/iOAlT
[15] سعيد عكاشة، بعد اغتيال نصر الله: هل تغير إسرائيل استراتيجيتها تجاه حزب الله؟، مركز الأهرام للدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية، تاريخ النشر: ٢٩ سبتمبر ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/zIQGJ
[16] “المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق” تستهدف قاعدة جوية بإسرائيل، الجزيرة نت، تاريخ النشر: ١٤ يونيه ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/qTozP
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[19] نتنياهو وحلم “إسرائيل” الكبرى: من غزة إلى الأمم المتحدة وعدوان جديد على لبنان، الميادين، تاريخ النشر: ٢٧ سبتمبر ٢٠٢٤، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/MyiXF
[20] توطين الفلسطينيين بسيناء.. ما هو مشروع “غيورا إيلاند” الذي رفضته مصر؟، العربية، تاريخ النشر: ٢ نوفمبر ٢٠٢٣، متاح على الرابط: https://linksshortcut.com/yfjxY
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